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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the experiences of a publicly owned hospital which had 
formerly been part of a religious order of nuns. This paper presents novel findings to 
extend our understanding of the emergent theory of transparency in the public sector. 
The literature on secrecy and transparency is drawn upon to inform a case study 
investigation of the use of accounting under both forms of ownership. This reveals 
both the continuing influence of this hospital`s prior existence and the difficulties of 
adapting to public ownership. The findings reveal the tensions of the change from 
secretive religious organisation and history of parsimony to current public sector 
organisation. The end state of public sector ownership brings its own difficulties, 
with accounting systems failing to achieve the aim of transparency.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the increasingly topical issue of transparency (Heald, 2006a, 
2006b, 2012 and 2013; Hood and Heald, 2006; Meijer, 2009, 2012, 2013) in publicly 
owned entities. The nature of transparency in organisations is a matter of some 
complexity (Hood, 2010), which some commentators regard as overvalued (Etzioni, 
2010) and which some organisations apply with a lack of subtlety (Roberts, 2009).  
The specific focus of this study is on transparency of accounting information in 
health care, which is recognised as an area of particular complexity for public sector 
accounting (Brinkerhoff, 2004;Blomgren, 2007; Lavay and Waks, 2009; Knudsen, 
2011). While the subject of health care accounting has attracted the attention of many 
 2 
researchers over the past few decades (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008), the major 
efforts of researchers to date have been on publicly-owned hospitals. In this paper we 
examine the experiences of an organisation which has shifted from the voluntary, 
non-profit, charitable sector to the public sector. Voluntary (non-publicly owned) 
hospitals play a significant role in health care in Ireland with five of the six largest 
Dublin hospitals still having voluntary status. This paper contributes to our 
understanding of change processes in public service organisations, particularly as 
they affect accounting. It also extends our understanding of the nature of non-profit 
organisations and the challenges they face in contemporary society. This paper also 
contributes to the emergent theory on transparency by extending its primary emphasis 
on external accountability to include internal transparency and the visibility of 
accounting to key actors within public service organisations (Heald, 2012).  
 
This paper proceeds in the following stages. In the first section, the theoretical 
framework of the contrasting worlds of religious secrecy and public sector 
transparency are explored. Second, the research context of the non-profit 
organisation in this study is examined and the research design - a field study, based 
on a case study hospital over the years 2002 - 2013 is explained.  In the third section 
of the paper, there is an analysis of the experiences of this hospital on its move from 
the non-profit to the public sector, through the lens of key actors involved in the case 
study hospital. Finally, conclusions are set out. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework: Secrecy, Transparency and Visibility 
 
The specific focus of this study is on an acute non-profit hospital, which was founded 
and managed by a religious order until its transfer to public sector ownership in 2001. 
The distinctive values of religious organisations (Wolfe and Pickard, 1980, p.61; 
Laughlin, 1990; Booth, 1993) present an interesting accounting research context, 
which remains an area of relative neglect (Parker, 2002; McPhail, Gorringe and Gray, 
2005; Carmona and Ezzamel, 2006).  The manner in which we study and understand 
the work of religious organisations is becoming more sophisticated, as we shift from 
earlier, simplistic notions of how religious organisations conduct themselves (Jacobs, 
2005).  This issue is addressed in this paper.   
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The particular concept this paper seeks to add to is a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of secrecy in the work of religious organisations (Simmel, 
1906; Simmel, cited in Wolff, 1950).  The attribute of secrecy in organisations 
generally, and specifically in religious activity, contrasts with the public sector 
preoccupation with transparency and merits further study (Hood, 2006; Birchall, 
2011; Costas and Grey, 2014).  This tension is exemplified in this paper, by 
examining the practices of this voluntary hospital which has moved from religious to 
public sector ownership, at a time when the public sector is in the midst of significant 
managerial reforms.  These issues are explored further in the context of (1) 
accounting and secrecy in religious organisations, and (2) public sector transparency, 
especially in the field of health care.  
 
 
 
1. Accounting and Secrecy in Religious Organisations 
 
There is a limited literature concerned with accounting in religious organisations 
(Abdul-Rahman and Goddard, 1998; Quattrone, 2004) despite the social significance 
of religious institutions (Parker, 2002). In his seminal study of accounting in 
churches, Laughlin (1990) observed a fundamental distinction between beliefs in 
spiritual issues (the sacred) and systems used to support them (the secular).  This 
distinction of sacred and profane draws on Durkheim’s thesis that all religion has this 
fundamental characteristic.  In Laughlin’s (op. cit) terms, accounting is seen as a 
support activity and is profane: it is an irrelevancy to the core of the church 
organisation.  There is some, limited support for this distinction as an explanation of 
how accounting is used within religious organisations. For example, an early study by 
Wolfe and Pickford (1980) documented the limited role for accounting in the Church 
of Scotland.  This study revealed arcane accounting practices, which narrowed 
accounting to specific funds (general and specific trusts) located within specific 
boards of the church, which removed it from the central activity of the church and 
rendered it invisible to a core membership.  Also, Laughlin’s own (1988) study of the 
Church of England noted how the church commissioners used its accounting system 
to ‘purposefully’ make themselves accountable both to the sacred church and to the 
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profane state to secure its continued existence.  In this study, Laughlin found that the 
accounting system was designed to address accountability concerns rather than 
internal decision-making. However, Espejo, Manjón and Sánchez-Matamoros (2006) 
found that there was a shared perception that rendering accounts was part of the 
sacred sphere, yet accountability was considered a profane tool. 
 
However, for some time before this Booth (1993) argued that the construct of the 
secular divide of the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ should simply be regarded as a 
theoretical ideal. Furthermore, Jacobs (2005) has challenged this dichotomy as an 
oversimplified representation of organisations which interact with employers, 
members, the wider public, and the state in complex ways.  More recently, Bigoni, 
Gagliardo and Funnell (2013) find that secular accounting and accountability 
practices were not considered as inevitably antithetical to religious values, as would 
be expected by Laughlin and Booth.  The ‘sacred/profane’ dichotomy sheds light on 
the practices of religious organisations, but it is too narrow and too static to capture 
the subtleties of religious organisations and the dynamic of their organisation.  
However, the concept of the ‘sacred’ is fundamental to religious organisations.  In 
this study the concept of the sacred is explored further, in the context of secrecy and 
religion. 
 
From the earliest times, religious or sacred activities have been associated with 
secrecy (Simmel, 1906; Bok, 1982; Bolle, 1987; Duncan, 2006).  This link between 
religion and secrecy is widespread.  Etzioni (1999) observed how advocates of rights 
to privacy frequently employed the term ‘sacred’ to justify these rights, although 
these people did not otherwise draw on religious terminology, images or beliefs.  This 
claimed right to privacy reveals the fundamental attribute of secrecy: hidden 
knowledge (Mathewes, 2006).  Indeed, Bok (1982, p.6) sees concealment or hiding as 
the defining trait of secrecy.  Secrecy within a religious order can be seen as a 
mechanism which fosters feelings of brotherhood, of togetherness, especially 
amongst those inside the order against non-believers (Bok, 1982).  But secrecy within 
a religious organisation may also fulfil important control functions.  Control over 
secrecy may be necessary to protect the identity and values of the members of the 
religious order (Simmel, 1906; Bok, 1982). 
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More importantly, the emergence of secret activity is most closely associated with 
change, transition and transformation (Simmel, 1906; Hazelrigg, 1969; Bok, 1982; 
Middleton, 1987).  Hazelrigg (1969) depicts a scenario of transformation which 
brings with it the need for the protection of secrecy.  In this way, the exercise of 
control over secrecy helps to guard against change, growth or decay, progress or 
backsliding (Bok, 1982).  Thus, secrecy is more associated with power and change 
rather than authority and stability (Middleton, 1987).  This refuge in secrecy as a 
form of protection in a time of transition is most evident in the behaviour of religious 
movements (Simmel, 1906) and can be seen as a protection of identity (Costas and 
Grey,2014). 
 
The manner in which this control through secrecy is exercised contrasts with the 
dichotomy of the sacred and the profane (Laughlin, 1988; 1990).  Hazelrigg (1969) 
depicts the role of secrecy as the means of manipulation and control of information as 
the central variable in social organisation. In the exercise of this control, the use of 
information which might be regarded as alien to the religious order, as remote from 
its everyday experience, facilitates secrecy (Middleton, 1987). This concealed 
knowledge of information (Bok, 1982) need not be fully understood by the key actors 
– the crucial issue is their ability to control the flow of this information (Middleton, 
1987).  Accounting and financial information can have a central role in this process, 
according to Simmel (1906).  Financial values have distinct attributes which facilitate 
the dissimulation, the concealment of actions and intentions according to Simmel 
(1906): compressibility, an abstract nature, and the possibility of action at a distance.  
These attributes facilitate an otherwise unattainable level of secrecy. This 
dissimulation is seen as most effective when exercised by the central authority of the 
religious organisation (Simmel, 1906; Hazelrigg, 1969).  These observations on the 
nature and prevalence of secrecy (in this case in religious organisations) creates a 
tension with the rise of transparency in contemporary society as a kind of cultural 
idea (Birchall, 2011). Next we discuss the nature of transparency in public sector 
organisations. 
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2. Public Sector Transparency  
 
The above discussion of secrecy contrasts with a fundamental, desired attribute of 
accounting and management in public sector organisations – transparency.  
Transparency may be seen as an effective remedy to secrecy (O Neill, 2006).  
However, transparency may be defined and described in many ways (Hood, 2006).  
The New Public Management (NPM) focus is a results-orientation which encourages 
scrutiny of public sector organisations and accountability for results (Hood, 1991).  
The development of accountability increases the transparency of organisations by 
increasing the number of things that are made visible and increasing the number of 
ways in which things are made visible (Gray, 1992, p.415).  NPM reforms have 
centred around “enhanced transparency in organizational functions” and greater 
performance specification and monitoring (Guthrie, Olson and Humphrey, 1999, 
p.216).  
 
In the context of this paper, transparency may be defined as denoting “government 
according to fixed and published rules, on the basis of information and procedures 
that are accessible to the public” (Hood, 2001, p.71). This descriptor of transparency 
emphasises an outward facing, external accountability regime for public service 
organisations.  However, the mirror image of this external accountability is an 
enhanced internal transparency of accounting information – broadly defined – within 
public service organisations (Heald, 2012). In Heald`s analysis, vertical 
accountability, which is a characteristic of hierarchical public sector organisations, is 
always accompanied by horizontal pressures for inwards transparency within the 
organisation (Heald, 2012).  This is the logical outcome of a new managerial regime 
ushered in by NPM in which managers have to respond to financial and performance 
information and this information is then shared beyond the boundaries of public 
service organisations with external stakeholders as a necessary part of public 
accountability. In this way internal transparency can be seen as an essential 
component of effective managerial decision making and control systems (Schedler, 
2003; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Wouters and Wilderom, 2008; Chapman and 
Kihn, 2009). This phenomenon of internal transparency is related to the strand of 
accounting literature which has observed the increased visibility of accounting 
information, particularly in government organisations, as a means by which the 
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efficiency of key actors in organisations can be observed and tracked as a part of 
performance management systems (Hopwood, 1990, p.416; Miller and O`Leary, 
1994, p.99). 
 
This aspect of the modernisation of public services has given weight to transparency 
as a desirable attribute per se, as the following comment by Hood (1996, p.155) 
explains:  
budgets are becoming more ‘transparent’ in accounting terms, attributing costs to 
outputs and measuring outputs by qualitative performance indicators. 
This observation by Hood captures the manner in which internal accounting visibility 
and external accountability coalesce in the achievement of transparency.  The 
intrinsic merit of transparency as a feature of public management is advanced by 
Shah, Murphy and McIntosh (2003).  Transparency becomes accountability by 
turning measures into targets (Strathern, 2004), and underpins systems of 
measurement that require the setting of some ideal level of attainment. The power of 
transparency lies in its value to others to control from a distance (O Neill, 2006). 
Indeed, Hood (2006) describes ‘transparency’ in public management as having 
acquired a ‘quasi-religious’ influence.  However, transparency is not something that 
can be requested ‘it has to be institutionalized through transparency legislation, 
departmental policy or at the least, bureaucratic daily practice’ (McGregor, 2003, 
p.169). Transparency without accountability is pointless (OECD, 2008, p.7), it is not 
an end in itself but a powerful tool to improve accountability by countering 
opaqueness (Roberts, 2009).  
 
There are different dimensions to this emphasis on public sector transparency.  On 
the one hand this desirability is seen as essential in promoting effective public 
accountability (Koppell, 2005). However, it is also seen as having a wider relevance 
to all areas of the public sector, in general, but health care (see Lowe, 2000), in 
particular.  Historically, accounting and financial matters in health care have had a 
limited visibility to key actors within public organisations (Blomgren, 2007).  In the 
early 1900s in the UK, Burdett’s system of hospital accounting contributed to the 
standardisation of hospital administrative systems (Jones and Mellett, 2007). 
Accounting in many health care organisations has moved “centre stage” to the extent 
that the cost of procedures has become commonplace in the discussion of the 
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provision of care (Jones and Mellett, 2007). It is through financial and management 
accounting practices that managerial and public accountability is achieved in modern-
day organizations (Messner, 2009). Accounting in contemporary societies follows the 
provision of state funding to mostly state-owned organizations and is the mechanism 
which facilitates hierarchical control and upwards transparency (Heald, 2012), using 
standardized financial systems which facilitate control from a distance (Jones and 
Mellett, 2007). A well-designed hierarchy of reporting documents is essential to 
underpin meaningful transparency (Heald, 2012), thus allowing users to drill down 
from an overview to relevant segmental details as needed.  
 
NPM reforms have accentuated the need for greater transparency from health care 
organisations (Levay and Waks, 2009). The pre-NPM world of health care 
organisations is depicted by Lapsley (1992, pp. 237-238) as a context in which the 
senior accountant was called `the Treasurer`. In the pre NPM era, Lapsley (1992, 
p.238) characterised the invisibility of accounting information as an absence of 
meaningful budgets, and treasurers as mere bookkeepers with a major focus on 
achieving an overall financial balance. Lapsley (1992, p.238) described NHS internal 
accounting as `financial management by stealth` in the pre NPM era.  This lack of 
transparency continued for some time as the path to the introduction of budgets and 
costing information in the NHS was a slow and tortuous process (Lapsley, 1994; 
2001).  
 
The achievement of transparency may be considered to be of particular significance 
in the complex arena of health care, which touches many lives and in which the 
multi-professional environment has been characterised historically as dominated by a 
divide between health care professionals, on the one hand, and the management or 
administrative cadres, on the other hand (Coombs, 1987, Jacobs, Marcon and Witt, 
2004) but more recently by greater involvement of clinical managers in management 
control practices (Lethonen, 2007; Pettersen, 2013;Veronesi, Kirkpatrick & 
Vallascas, 2013).  Specifically it is recognised that, within health care, both internal 
and external transparency are necessary for the effective functioning of health care 
organisations (Martin, Giacomini and Singer, 2002). The particular focus of this 
paper is on internal transparency and visibility of accounting information, but we 
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recognise that this circumstance is inextricably linked with issues of external 
transparency. 
 
Research Context and Research Design  
 
This paper examines the use of management accounting in a voluntary, religious, 
non-profit acute hospital in Ireland which transfers to public ownership. The major 
dominating feature of the context in which this hospital operates is the importance of 
religion, specifically, the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. In the 19th century the 
voluntary, non-profit hospital movement was encouraged and supported in Ireland by 
the Roman Catholic Church (Robbins and Lapsley, 2008). As part of this movement, 
voluntary hospitals were established in the 19th century and continue to operate in the 
present day. However, these voluntary hospitals had a distinct religious ethos – they 
were founded to care for patients’ spiritual needs as well as to provide medical care. 
These religious voluntary hospitals received support not only from the Catholic 
Church, but also from leading members of the medical profession who were members 
of the Roman Catholic faith (Barrington, 2003). These voluntary hospitals were also 
supported by many nuns, female members of the Catholic faith, who worked for 
nothing, often donating their wages to the hospital in which they worked (Wren, 
2003).  
 
However, despite the pervasive influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland, the 
exposure of the Irish economy to ideas of the New Public Management (Hood, 1991, 
1995) is also a factor in understanding public services in the Irish context. While the 
international spread of NPM ideas has been documented by Hood (1995) and by 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), the Irish Government was a late adopter, but a 
distinctive late but decisive adopter. Indeed, the Irish Government codified NPM 
ideas as best practice in its Public Service Management Act of 1997. New legislation 
was introduced in various part of the public sector – for instance in health, local 
government, justice. In the health sector, the Health Amendment Act of 1996 together 
with other sectoral legislation intensified pressures on traditional, bureaucratic public 
services to adopt new management techniques, procedures and ways of thinking 
(Robbins and Lapsley, 2005). This meant that the hospital in this case study was 
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shifting from the non-profit sector to a public sector which was in the process of 
implementing far-reaching management reforms. 
 
The case study approach adopted in this paper has been endorsed because of the 
richness of the data (Stake, 1995; Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Chapman, 2008). . The 
current case study enables the study of the context in which management accounting 
is practised by tracing practices, over time (Bryman, 2000, 2004; Chapman, 2008; 
Yin, 2009). This research approach involves probing and clarification and 
retrospective accounts which can be collected to foster a longitudinal perspective 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p.53).  
A significant advantage of case studies is the capability of using a variety of 
techniques for data collection (Stake, 1995; Bryman, 2000; Yin, 2009). Within the 
present case study, the research team used the following data sources: (a) 
documentation (examples of accounting reports, internal reports), (b) archival records 
(minutes of Board of Directors meetings, together with supporting documentation), 
(c) some limited observation and (d) interviews with key informants at three levels – 
MT hospital, regional health authority and Department of Health. 
 
Both sources of data (a) and (b) provided valuable insights into the everyday world of 
the case study hospital. This hospital has been named Maria Theresa (or MT) hospital 
for reasons of confidentiality. The material was collected over the period 2002-2013 
which reflects Bryman`s (2000, p.242) approach that, in detailed case study 
investigations, researchers should `keep in touch with, and return to`, the site of their 
investigation. 
 
The third source of data - observation – was limited because there was limited time 
for observation, but also because it was not feasible to undertake observation over the 
life of the hospital including its prior life as a non-profit hospital. To the extent that 
there was observation in this research it was non-participant and `on the periphery of 
the action` (Bryman, 2000, p.153). As such, this use of observation was essentially 
supplementary to augment documentary materials and interviews (Robson, 2002, p. 
312).  
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The final source of data (d) was interviews with key informants (Jones, 1996). This 
was a carefully designed nested set of interviewees (Lewis, 2003, p.54) who were 
well placed to provide insights from a variety of perspectives which facilitated a 
comparison of the Maria Theresa Hospital both as a charity and as a publicly owned 
entity.  This included twenty-four interviews with: past and current management 
staff; clinicians and nursing staff many of whom worked there over this eleven year 
period, staff from the charity era; oversight officials in the Regional Health Board 
and the Department of Health who had experience of dealing with MT hospital, both 
as a charity and as a publicly-owned hospital. 
 
The first level of interviews of key informants was with senior members of the MT 
hospital. Second, management at the next level down at MT were interviewed. These 
first two tranches of interviews also afforded the opportunity to investigate both 
experiences of MT hospital as a charity and as a public hospital as there was 
continuity of employment in both organisations for senior members of the team – the 
clinical staff – hospital consultants and nursing staff. The final interviews with 
hospital staff were completed in 2013 - two further consultant hospital doctors 
(Clinician 3 and 4), a senior nurse manager, and the finance director.  
 
Third, the research team identified key informants who had direct experience of the 
era of MT as a charitable hospital: a senior member of the religious order who had 
had management responsibility in the charitable hospital era and who continued to be 
a presence in the new public hospital,  a member of the MT Board of Directors from 
1990-2001 when it was a charity, and the senior hospital finance staff.,  
Fourth, four interviews were held with senior officials at the Regional Hospital Board 
who had an oversight responsibility for the MT hospital when it was both a charity 
and publicly owned. These key informants had regular contact with the management 
of MT in the charitable and public ownership eras.  
Finally, the Assistant Secretary and the Assistant Principal, both senior civil servants 
in the Department of Health, were interviewed.  Each had oversight experience of 
MT hospital as a charity and as a publicly owned hospital. In total, 24 interviews 
were held. These were semi-structured and lasted one and a half to two hours.  
Following transcription, a themed analysis was prepared.  
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 The Case Study: The Transition to a Public Sector Hospital 
 
Although the hospital transferred to public ownership in 2001, the research team 
observed that it has retained many of the symbols of its former religious ownership.  
A strong religious influence is evident within this hospital.  The religious order’s four 
core values: Dignity, professionalism, justice in the workplace and compassion 
underpinned their work in the hospital and are still visible in the out-patient clinic in 
the form of a wall-mounted framed poster. This value statement notes: “that 
accountability is an essential component of our service”. It also states the religious 
orders view on the use and care of resources: “We use all our resources to help others 
and take every precaution to ensure that they are used or stored with care”. A further 
manifestation of the lingering religious influence is the retention of a large crib (each 
December) and a large religious statue inside the hospital entrance, to mark its 
Christian origins.  The hospital chapel remains open to patients, staff, visitors and 
locals on a daily basis. Other examples include notices on walls with quotations from 
the Bible.  For example, one hospital director had the statement that “the patient’s 
record is a sacred trust”.  This transitional state is typical of the passage from secrecy 
to openness (Simmel, 1906). However, despite these lingering indications of where 
this hospital originated, there were strong influences which emerged from public 
ownership.  These influences were (1) the shift from the secretive workings of the 
religious voluntary organisation to a public sector one, (2) inadequate accounting 
information systems as a barrier to public sector transparency, and (3) the tensions 
around public sector transparency and resource constraints in MT as a public sector 
hospital. These three strands of MT hospital influences  are examined next. 
 
1. From Religious Secrecy to Public Sector Transparency  
  
The simple interpersonal systems for solving financial problems which served the 
nuns well in an earlier era could no longer support the growing more formal hospital 
organisation.  
My aunt and her friend helped the nuns a great deal.  She would go and have tea with 
them and they would set out their problems in private e.g. we have no radios in the 
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public wards, so the cue was … “how do we get radios in the public wards”?  … and 
my aunt would help with fundraising.   
   (Ex Member of the Board of Directors) 
 
Such informal systems which relied heavily on philanthropy, benevolence and 
informal contacts with people of wealth and means could not sustain the hospital and 
provide for its equipment and facilities needs given the growth in technology costs, 
increasing sophistication and cost of medical equipment and the rising expectations 
of patients and their families.  As needs arose for funding, the religious order and 
hospital managers would approach the Department [of Health] for assistance. 
We’d blaze a trail up to Dublin. We’d sit in front of somebody in the Department of 
Health and we’d cry until we’d get something.    
(Clinician 1) 
The nuns in charge of this hospital did not see the need to develop accounting 
information systems, relying instead on cash-based information held centrally 
(Simmel, 1906; Hazelrigg, 1969) to manage finances in secret. This accords with 
views of how religious ‘sacred’ organisations function (Simmel, 1906; Hazelrigg, 
1969; Middleton, 1987).  Members of the religious order working in the hospital were 
paid an amount for their work but it was unclear to them how much they received, as 
this member revealed:    
We just didn’t know what we were paid because it didn’t come to us.  
      (Member – religious order)   
    
Salaries for nurses were paid directly to the Order for the benefit and upkeep of the 
religious community.  Under ownership of the religious order of nuns there was a 
great deal of secrecy over the management of the hospital. Whilst there were 
structures in place such as the Executive Team and Hospital Board there was a lack 
of communication of information about the change in ownership to any staff in the 
hospital, even those on the Executive Team and members of the Board of Directors 
similarly were not informed.  
It was the nuns and the hospital authority that really did everything with the … Health 
Authority and we were kept totally in the dark about it.   
(Clinician 1) 
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When I heard about the exit of the nuns and likely transfer to public ownership, I was 
quite upset about it.  The idea of the state taking over our hospital was just dreadful.   
        (Ex Board Member) 
 
This contrasts with the Laughlin (1988; 1990) “sacred” and “profane” divide, for 
here, in this case study hospital, the nuns retained possession of financial information 
and dealt with the outside world on financial matters and excluded the hospital 
doctors and almost all members of the Board of Directors from these deliberations.   
These secretive negotiations echo Simmel (1906) that secrecy is a form of protection 
in times of transition within religions organisations.  
 
Nuns were involved in the hospital in the pastoral care  and mission effectiveness 
functions for more than eight years following the transfer of ownership. Since 
transfer of ownership the mission effectiveness function no longer has a chair at the 
management table. These functions underpinned the ethos of the hospital as 
illustrated below: 
The essence of our order is to serve people with love and compassion.  Mission 
effectiveness involves dealing with staff – trying to inspire and empower staff with our 
ethos and spirit – to serve with love and compassion.  
(Member – religious order)  
 
This observation underlines the distinctive nature of this kind of voluntary 
organisation.   More recently mission effectiveness has merged with bereavement 
counselling and is carried out by a lay-person. In the era of religious ownership, the 
mission effectiveness function “looked after retirements and the long service awards. 
They would, send out notification to people when they were due a long service award 
at 10, 20, 30 years and it arranged a little function and had a little service in the 
church and a little tea party afterwards and gave everybody a momentum, a little 
clock or something” (Senior Nurse Manager). In the public sector era this aspect of 
mission effectiveness has been replaced by a newsletter.  
 
The pre-transfer period 1997 to 2000 was a time of fiscal crisis for the hospital which 
was characterised by large operational deficitis and a relative invisibility of 
accounting information, in the more secretive religious organisation. The finance 
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manager was charged with bringing the hospitals finances into line so that it would 
appear as a more attractive target for a takeover of ownership and management by the 
regional Health Authority.  Prior to this effort to resolve the fiscal crisis, financial 
information was not shared with hospital staff.  The primary aim of the hospital 
finance function was to prepare historical financial stewardship reports for the 
Department of Health.    
Our management meetings were different… [speaking of the hospital as a voluntary 
religious hospital]. They were very defensive. People minded their own corners.  There 
was little sharing of information with the rest of the team.    
(ex Finance Manager)  
 
This position changed with the proposed move to public ownership and the move to 
more transparent management.  The new Clinicians in Management structure, put in 
place during the transition discussions (1999-2001), required a sharing of information 
that brought issues to the fore that under the old management structure may have 
been discussed quietly with the CEO, as the former Finance Manager observed:  
I didn’t mind being open about our overspend. It was no secret.....  People were 
delighted with the discussion of the budgets, they didn’t have that before. … There was 
great transparency at the management table at the weekly management meeting. I 
thought it worked very well.  
(ex Finance Manager)  
 
The above comment illustrates how working relationships between management staff 
improved under the new directorate structure and there was significant teamwork and 
co-operation, as the Director of Care explained:   
We would prepare it [a submission for funding] as a directorate………So say it was 
something that the Medical Director was doing, I would get a copy of it and I would 
have a look at it and we would talk about it and we would amend and develop it - that 
is the way we do our business now.    
   
The above observations are consistent with the advocacy of integration of hospital 
doctors in hospital management (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1990; Eldenburg, 
Soderstrom, Willis and Wu, 2010).  Indeed, the shift from the secretive organisation 
of the past to the new style, transparent public sector organisation was welcomed by 
doctors.  Consultant hospital doctors considered that they now have more control as 
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measured by greater representation and voice at the hospital management table, as 
indicated by the following clinician:   
Having a Medical Director, means that we’re integrated into management.  You see 
consultants never had a say at management level before and that led to incredible 
frustration.   
(Clinician 2) 
 
Consultant hospital doctors are interested in being part of the management team at 
this hospital. This contrasts with early studies of clinical budgeting (Jones & Dewing, 
1997;) but is consistent with more recent research (Lapsley, 2001; Jacobs, Marcon 
and Witt, 2004; Scarparo, 2006; Eldenburg, Soderstrom, Willis, Wu, 2010;  
Pettersen, 2013; and Veronesi, Kirkpatrick, and Vallascas, 2013). In this case study, 
the clinicians viewed access to accounting information as empowering. The 
consultant doctors in this hospital accepted the need for applying the principles of 
business management to management of the hospital. This acceptance of NPM-style 
ideas of adopting private sector business practices (Hood, 1991) is exemplified by 
this clinician’s statement:   
It is vital that we [consultant doctors] have a lot to do with management…Yes, it [the 
hospital] is a business.  It’s a caring business but it’s a business. It needs business 
management.  Anything that has to do with having to live within financial constraints is 
a business. Now that was an objectionable word when the nuns were here. They 
wouldn’t look at it that way but I think it’s very true, it’s a business.   (Clinician 1)  
 
For doctors the tension between, and trumping of, clinical accountability over 
manageial accountability as examined in (Lehtonen, 2007) is exemplified here.  
I became much more aware as clinical director, that seventy five, eighty per cent of 
cost is to do with staff and I would see from a management point of view how hard it 
is to get resources.  ...However, as clinical director my focus is on the patient. It’s not 
on politics, it’s not on finance.   
                                                                              (Clinician 3) 
 
The directorate structure put in place in 1999-2000 with its inter functional focus has 
made visible the lack of financial information available to directorate managers to 
manage their areas. This resulted in increased demands by managers for more 
financial information. It became clear how difficult it was for managers to manage in 
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a vacuum of financial and management information.  Public sector ownership has 
made visible (Brunsson et al, 1998) the dearth of information flowing to senior 
managers at MT hospital, as the following comment illustrates:  
 
I was twelve months here [in 2001] before I knew what the actual budget was for my area.  
(Director of Nursing) 
 
 
2.        Inadequate Accounting Information Systems as a Barrier to Public  
           Sector Transparency 
 
 
While an increased emphasis on transparency opens up a space for accounting (Chua 
and Preston, 1994; Nahapiet, 1988; Strathern, 2004; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 2009; 
and Heald 2006a, 2006b, 2012), concerns have been expressed over the capability of 
hospital accounting systems to make meaningful connections with hospital managers 
(Preston et al, 1992; Lawrence et al, 1994;  Jones and Mellett, 2007).  Indeed, the 
financial reporting infrastructure in this hospital when it was both religiously owned 
and when it became a public sector hospital, was weak.  Control and review of 
expenditure is difficult given an embedded system which was centred round the 
stewardship reporting needs of the central government department, the Department of 
Health, as the former finance manager explained:    
The IMR [Integrated Management Report] required by the Department [of Health] had 
to be produced by the twenty–fifth of the following month.  Our accounting systems 
and staff were geared that way…. It was very difficult to get information in advance of 
that date.  It was really difficult to keep people in check then as regards the budget and 
budgetary control.      
(ex-Finance Manager) 
 
Under the Health Amendment Act 1996, the annual service plan details the planned 
activity a hospital will deliver for the funding they receive.  The budgeting process in 
the hospital is the service planning process.  This process starts midyear. However, 
this transparency is accompanied by public sector rigidity: a major tension, and this 
type of tension typifies many public sector organisations (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000).  The annual budget for the hospital is not known until December each year.  
The budgeting process is on a year-by-year basis, which results in problems of 
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planning for services over the medium to longer term, as the following clinician 
observed:  
You see there is no proper budget strategy as such.  There is no over-arching plan and 
that is the way the Department of Health works.   
                                                                   (Clinician 1) 
Under public sector ownership, local hospital management were charged with 
distilling the service plan inputs from all departments into a manageable document 
for the regional Health Authority.  This input was further distilled at regional Health 
Authority level into a summarised version, which was then submitted to the 
Department of Health.  The subsequent further distillation of the hospital service plan 
at Health Authority level on occasions created noise and frustrations in the 
communication process between the hospital, Health Authority and the Department 
of Health.  The version that finally reached the Department of Health is something 
that the regional Health Authority might have wished for, but local hospital clinical 
staff were unaware of.  And here we have a form of “transparency” in which means 
and ends can become opaque, dependent on perspective and focus, as the following 
comment illustrates: 
…our last nine page service plan generated after some considerable effort by this 
department was condensed in the regional Health Authority service plan into a single 
line which ran something to the effect that ‘The [XYZ department] in MT is 
continuing it’s co-operation with ‘AN Other’ Hospital’ (60 kilometres away).  Now 
there is absolutely no co-operation between the two departments on any level.  So the 
single sentence that got into the health authority service plan was inaccurate.  … It’s a 
bit like butting your head against a brick wall.  
(Clinician 2) 
Other senior clinical staff don’t see the point in a service plan for a demand-led 
service such as maternity.  
When I hear it [service planning] it kind of sends a little shiver up my spine. …all I 
can safely say is that we will deliver all the women that come through the door. We 
won’t refuse any of them if they want to come here. We are not deciding that we have 
a quota system based on our resources.  
                                                                                         (Clinician 3) 
 
The new directorate structure implemented in 1999 facilitated increased transparency.  
Financial information was visible and openly discussed by management staff on the 
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Executive Management Team.  Before this, financial information was not discussed 
by those responsible for the management of human and other resources.   
 
There was great transparency at the management table under the directorate structure.  
Some people didn’t like it but from a financial control perspective, I thought it worked 
very well.  
       (Ex Finance Manager) 
 
This increased transparency extends beyond senior management.  Summaries of 
monthly management meetings were made available to all staff in the hospital 
reading room. With these new structures, staff now knew who to speak to, if they had 
an issue of concern that they would like discussed at a monthly management meeting.  
This clarity in the information flow was not available prior to the introduction of the 
new directorate management structures where decisions had been shrouded in 
secrecy.  An example of this more open, sharing approach was evident in 
management meetings at which each member of the management team has to prepare 
in advance for the meeting and select three key issues of importance for discussion.  
As the Director of Care expressed it: 
Each directorate prepares a monitoring report of what goes on for the month. It means 
that you have to share information before you go into the meeting.  If there is an 
issue… you will talk with the relevant person prior to going into the meeting, so that 
meetings don’t become disruptive and defensive.   
 
There was a growing understanding of the need for improved financial information as 
illustrated below and as understood by other clinical staff interviewed as part of this 
study:  
I think accounting and financial information is essential in management of hospitals 
and we're well behind the international norm.  In America, for each patient episode you 
can get a spreadsheet right down to the paracetamol tablet.  
(Clinician 4) 
 
However, improved accounting control systems did not coincide with the move to 
public sector ownership, although there was some improvement in transparency.  
Transparency of resource usage provides a challenge for hospital management.  The 
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under investment and under development of management systems over the years 
continues to present challenges as hospital managers do not have detailed data on 
resource usage to support explanations for increases in costs and budget overruns. 
 
Despite consensus on the need for improved financial information for management 
control, development of accounting or financial systems has not occurred.  
We are still [2013] using an old system to produce our accounts.  It doesn’t give us the 
level of detail we want, in the format that we want it, and the information is provided 
much too late for any effective management. I have seen systems back 20 years ago 
that are far better systems than what we have in place here today.   
                                            (Finance Manager)  
However, hospital accounting staff developed and adapted accounting reports to try 
to meet the needs of the management team as the team composition changed.  For 
each major cost area (example – radiology, laboratory, IT, maintenance) reports have 
been developed for those areas showing:  year to date pay and non-pay costs, a 
comparison to last year and a comparison with the budget.   
We did it, not because people were asking for it, but more to get information out there 
that would make people more cost conscious.  
      (Finance Manager)  
 
The primary aim of empowering managers to manage under the directorate model is 
frustrated by the lack of management information to inform decision-making. It is not 
possible for individual hospital managers at MT hospital to make the connection 
between budgets and activity as the design of the hospital’s information system does 
not facilitate this.  For several years post transfer clinical staff did not know their 
budgets and were therefore unable to begin to control expenditure using existing 
budgeting tools.  This hospital’s accounting system (like many others) had developed 
around the requirements of a central government department, the Department of 
Health, and this provides little useful information for local management of 
expenditure at the hospital level.  Evidence of expenditure links between clinical 
activity and financial budgets in terms of controllable costs is not provided because of 
weak financial systems.  The Integrated Management Report is the main means by 
which regional Health Authorities report on their financial performance monthly to 
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the Department of Health. The resources of the hospital’s finance function are centred 
round producing historical financial information to submit to the regional Health 
Authority to facilitate the preparation of the Integrated Management Report of the 
authority for submission to the Department of Health.    
 
Attempts at greater transparency are impeded by weak and poorly developed 
financial and management information systems – a legacy that placed little value on 
such systems in an attempt to do good for the community.  The above weaknesses of 
the MT Hospital’s accounting information reveal the frailties of accounting within 
public sector hospitals. There has been a shift from the invisibility of accounting in 
the religious, non profit context to the visibility (transparency) and abundance of 
accounting information in the public sector. But there has been a disconnection 
between the accounting information and its target recipients in the public sector, 
because of its poor quality and this is an important constraint on the achievement of 
transparency. In our view this is evidence of reforms based on NPM thinking. 
However, the expectation of transparency in financial matters is not achieved. A 
major factor in this is that accounting systems are not fit for purpose to meet the 
management demands of the new era.    
 
    
3.           Public Sector Transparency: Financial Constraints   
 
 
MT hospital has moved from an accounting famine in its religious period of 
ownership to one of an abundance of accounting information in the public sector. 
However, a caveat to this is that much of this abundance is irrelevant information. 
Early studies of public sector budgetary systems in hospitals (Preston et al, 1992; 
Lawrence et al, 1994; Jones and Dewing, 1997) have observed this phenomenon, 
while more recent studies (Lowe, 2000; Frandsen, 2010; Pettersen, 2013; Veronesi, 
Kirkpatrick, and Vallascas, 2013) bring to light how accounting is increasingly 
interlinked with medical practices today.  Perhaps more importantly, the motivation 
for MT hospital’s move into the public sector was to escape from the financial 
constraints of that sector.  However, the entire history of MT hospital is one of acute 
financial challenges. This is a story of continuity as MT moves from the charity, non 
profit sector to the public sector. 
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Over the years there was recognition by the religious order of the need to both control 
financial resources and to raise additional finances to augment those received from 
the government.  During ownership under the nuns there were many local initiatives 
to raise finance for equipment and new technology, as these comments reveal:  
There were a lot of local efforts to finance the hospital.  For example, the cat scan – we 
decided we needed a cat scan so we set up a cat scan committee.  We went around 
locally collecting money, and we got the money for the cat scan.  Every year for 
example, during the annual festival we, the student nurses and ourselves too, would go 
down into the pubs and hotels to collect money.   
                   (Member, religious order) 
 
One thing they were very good at was collecting their income.  
                                                          (Director of Finance – regional Health Authority) 
 
 
Years of financial stringency, weak financial management systems and poor strategic 
planning have left the hospital with equipment capacity deficits.   The shift to public 
sector ownership has made the resource constrained situation transparent.  
Furthermore, it has accentuated the limited capacity of the accounting systems to 
provide relevant management information.  However, the primary constraint is 
considered to be insufficient financial resources.  This may be partly explained by 
historical reasons, as the following comments reveal:  
We tried I suppose to run the hospital at the most efficient to provide the services that 
were necessary. 
                                                                                      (Senior member, religious order) 
 
Part of the reason there’s a problem here with under–funding, is that the nuns actually 
ran this place on a fairly tight financial basis, that’s the way they run things, so I think 
the hospital has been chronically under–funded for a long time.  
                                                                              (Clinician 1)  
 
Religious ownership had pared things down to the bone.  They [the nuns] were very 
efficient.   
                                                                                       (Clinician 2) 
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This view of parsimony (Hood, 1991) on the part of the religious order is well 
supported.  
 
As the national hospital budget allocation mechanism is primarily allocated on an 
historical basis plus an allowance for inflation, current resource constraints are in 
large part a result of past budget allocations.  Financial constraints have always been 
the greatest challenge facing staff at the hospital, both before and after the transition 
to public sector ownership.  The following comments illustrate how tightly finances 
were controlled by the religious order. 
 
The religious ownership pared down things. We used to have pencils tied to desks at 
one stage. We come from that kind of environment, which was very negative in some 
ways in that you didn’t move forward quickly enough.   
                                                                                      (Senior Paramedical Manager) 
 
The nuns ran a very tight ship and there really was no fat.(Senior Director – regional 
Health Authority)  
 
We think we have austerity now [2013] but nothing like when I trained under the nuns.  
The hospital was managed on a shoestring budget in the nun's time.   
                                                                                                 (Senior Nurse Manager) 
  
These observations provide further evidence which conflicts with the idea of financial 
management as profane and an activity beneath the dignity of these nuns (Laughlin, 
1988).  However, this parsimony also had deleterious effects as the existing 
weakened capital infrastructure position is a result of past low investment, as this 
clinician observed:   
All of the competition [public hospitals in the regional health authority area] has been 
upgraded apart from us. … We have had zip in regards to upgrading for years and it’s a 
gripe I have with the nuns as to how the place is static, but you never stay static, you 
are running downhill.   
(Clinician 2)  
 
We have had to be so careful about every halfpenny we are spending.  
       (Clinician 1)  
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Public sector ownership did bring easier access to resources and funding, at least 
initially, even after the emergence of the national fiscal crisis in 2008.  This view on 
easier access to resources in a public sector context is one shared by staff.  
Access to money even though times are tight [2013] appears to be much easier in a 
bigger [public sector] organisation  and as and when a piece of equipment goes down 
that’s vital to us we inform our regional health authority managers and it will be 
replaced or something will be put in place to keep you covered.   
(Finance Manager) 
However, while there is access to resources the process of accessing those resources  
is much more time consuming.  
It's so difficult to get equipment or anything now. In the past I told them what I 
wanted, I got it.  Now you have to get your three quotes, you have to fill forms, you 
have to send emails,  I have to get approval from Y, it goes back to X, then it goes 
back to stores again.  I could be waiting months and months and months now. The 
resources did come but very, very slowly. 
                                                                                  (Senior Nurse Manager) 
 
 
The resource constrained situation in the new public sector context creates tensions 
and conflicts.  Under religious ownership there was a direct line of communication 
between hospital management and the Department of Health.  
The nuns were tough bargaining women and they went up to the Department of Health  
themselves. They made their case and they came home with their budget.  
                                                                       (Clinician 3) 
Public sector ownership has brought with it particular challenges and opportunities: 
some loss of identity,  a greater bureaucracy and slower decision-making. However, 
there are more opportunities for staff in a public sector organisation connected with 
other organisations and more resources, at least initially.  
We have slowed to the public service pace. When the nuns were here I felt that there 
was a greater sense of this is our organisation and we will bend over backwards for it.  
I just get the stronger feeling of demarcation now.  
(Senior Nurse Manager) 
 
On the positive side there’s more money even though we’re overspent like hell there 
is more money, there are more services.  
(Clinician 4) 
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There is more opportunity.  There are new roles for anybody who wishes to have  
a stab at a new role. ...There are constantly new jobs within the regional health 
authority.   
(Finance Manager) 
 
But against these positive aspects of public sector ownership, there is the challenge of 
greater bureaucracy and the price of lost independence. 
They had the autonomy of a public voluntary hospital and they were able to make 
changes right there and then.  They would consult with their nurses and their doctors, 
sure they were nurse themselves. 
                                                                             (Clinician 3) 
The greatest loss results from the history of parsimony.  As noted earlier, the budget 
is allocated primarily on an historical base which is low relative to other similar sized 
hospitals. In more recent years the budgetary position has worsened after initially 
improving post transfer and in the five years thereafter. MT last broke even in 2008 
with a budget of €54 million.  Since then the budget has been reduced year on year as 
have all health service budgets.  
 
Remnants of religious ownership linger in a variety of ways: in physical 
representations – photographs, historical plaques, religious statutory, posters of 
values, and in more intangible ways – work ethic, team spirit and ethos.  
I think the ethos still prevails. That team spirit for survival still lingers. ...... I think 
also that we think for ourselves. We’ve had to do that over the years.  I would still feel 
that we are different  - that we are more patient centred.  
(Clinician 3) 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the issue of transparency in public sector accounting and 
accountability. The particular lens through which this issue was investigated was the 
experiences of a non-profit, voluntary hospital which transferred to public ownership. 
This research was based on a single case study and the usual caveat of over-
generalisation on the basis of such evidence applies. However, this research does 
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have interesting findings on the specific case study. In particular, Hazelrigg (1969) 
has observed that, by definition, empirical research in `secret` organisations is scarce, 
but the transition of this organisation to the public sector facilitated research access 
and this study adds to our understanding of accounting in a `secret` organisation. This 
paper also has four wider implications: (1) it underlines the need for contextual 
studies of accounting information (Miller,1994: Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008), (2) it 
extends our understanding of the nature of voluntary organisations: it adds further 
scepticism over the `sacred/secular divide` (Laughlin, 1988; Booth 1993; and Bigoni, 
Gagliardo and Funnell, 2013) and addresses the complexity of religious non profit 
organisations (Jacobs, 2005; Espejo, Manjón and Sánchez-Matamoros, 2006) by 
introducing the concept of secrecy, (3) this study also contributes to our 
understanding of clinical receptivity to accounting information, and (4) most 
importantly, this study also demonstrates the need to extend the emergent theory of 
transparency in accounting to internal transparency (Heald, 2006a, 2006b, 2012; 
Hood and Heald, 2006) in public sector accounting contexts. In particular Heald 
(2012) observes the importance of inwards transparency and this study supports this 
perspective. This underlines the complexity of transparency in action where 
organisations are confronted with difficult decision making (Meijer, 2013). 
 
 
Regarding (1) above, this was a study of a voluntary hospital owned and run by a 
religious order in Ireland, which transferred to public ownership after almost sixty 
years.  Dwindling numbers within religious orders which oversaw these voluntary 
hospitals precipitated the need to withdraw from both ownership and management of 
these hospitals, as is the case in this particular hospital - MT.  These factors underline 
the need for a precise and dense contextualisation of the factors at work to better 
appreciate the interplay of political and social forces and the role of accounting and 
management in different national and international settings. 
 
On (2) above, re the nature of non-profit religious organisations, the findings of this 
study further weaken the claims for a `sacred and secular divide` (Laughlin, 1988).  
Laughlin`s observation was that accounting, as an activity, can be considered profane 
and something which will not touch the sacred core of religious organisations. This 
study has shown how a religious order used – albeit primitive – accounting systems 
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to exercise and retain control over the hospital it founded. This is in direct 
contradiction of the `sacred and secular divide`. Furthermore, this study reaffirms the 
view (Jacobs, 2005) that religious organisations are complex study settings. The 
particular manifestation of such complexity in this study was secrecy.  
Regarding implication (3) above, there is a longstanding interest in clinical 
receptivity to accounting information. Early studies of this reported an unwillingness 
of hospital doctors to use accounting information (Preston et al, 1992) and hospital 
doctors regarding accounting information as alien (Jones and Dewing, 1997). 
However, more recent studies have revealed changes in clinical work practices as a 
consequence of implementing casemix accounting in hospitals (Lowe, 2000); clinical 
use of information where it suits their purposes (Lapsley, 2001); a willingness on the 
part of doctors to engage with what they regard as appropriate accounting 
information (Jacobs et al, 2004); and a desire to make connections between 
accounting information and clinical governance where this development enhances 
their control of circumstances (Scarparo, 2006), and greater efficiency in use of 
resources by doctors where they have been involved in designing the accounting 
system (Eldenburg, Soderstrom, Willis, Wu, 2010). The early view in the literature of 
clinical disinterest, resistance and hostility is further challenged in this study setting, 
where there is a consistent willingness on the part (of admittedly a small cohort) of 
clinicians and other staff over an extended period (eleven years) to engage with 
financial information. In this case, access to accounting and financial information was 
seen as a possible empowerment of the clinicians. However, the reality proved to be 
different, as discussed next.  
 
Regarding (4) above, the religious organisation in this case study shifted from a 
setting in which there was considerable intra-organisational secrecy to an 
environment which expected considerable transparency, especially of accounting 
information.  However, the public sector context brings with it its own set of 
difficulties over the (lack of) sophistication of accounting information, the rigidities 
of large scale bureaucracy and the tensions of seeking management solutions in 
resource–constrained situations.  The historic tight management of resources has had 
an influence on current budget allocations since these are made predominantly on the 
basis of historical provision.  Resource constraints were exacerbated across the entire 
public sector as a result of the fiscal crisis in Ireland as in many other countries from 
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2008 onwards.  Resource constraints, persisting from historical and contemporary 
reasons, continue to lead to tensions and frustrations for staff at the hospital.  
Accounting in this case study setting is geared towards stewardship concerns rather 
than as a resource for managerial decision–making of these scarce resources. The 
underlying accounting systems are blunt, inflexible and incapable of providing 
meaningful management information. There have been some innovations in 
accounting reports by accounting staff, outside of the existing accounting system, 
which have focused on cost control and have proved useful. There is both a greater 
volume of, and a greater visibility of accounting information but this is not 
sufficiently context specific or aligned with organisational structures and processes to 
facilitate more effective management. This raises important questions about 
transparency: the quality of information, the ability of recipients to interrogate it, and 
the capacity of recipients to act on available information – all are important 
dimensions of a comprehensive theory of transparency.  In this context, the public 
sector change provides an impetus for much more detailed accounting information 
from hospital management for transparency, than that prescribed in its former 
existence as a non profit hospital owned and operated by a religious order.  But, in 
this case study of a hospital in transition, the paradox is an outcome in which ‘more’ 
accounting means ‘less’ in terms of connections made with managers in the use of 
resources.  What is provided facilitates stewardship and limited upwards transparency 
(Heald, 2012) for those managing from a distance, rather than meaningful 
information for management control.  Accounting information here is opaque.  Yet, 
transparency is intended to counter opaqueness (Roberts, 2009). In the brave new era 
of the NPM, the public sector hospital offers more transparency, but little meaningful 
accounting information for hospital managers.  
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